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Abstract
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a
generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation,
we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this
kind of equilibria. Then, we present a symbolic procedure that allows us to describe
and estimate the number of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arbitrary
game. Under certain assumptions, the algorithm computes the exact number of these
equilibria.
1 Introduction
Noncooperative game theory is used to model and analyze strategic interaction situations.
Among its most outstanding applications, we can mention the fundamental role this theory
has played in economics (see, for example, the classical reference book [31]). Moreover,
game theory has also been applied to politics, sociology and psychology, and to biology
and evolution as well.
One of the main concepts in this theory is a Nash equilibrium, which consists in a
situation in which no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Since within this theory the players cannot communicate in order to decide a simultaneous
∗Partially supported by the following Argentinian research grants: UBACyT X112 (2004-2007) and
CONICET PIP 5852/05.
†Partially supported by the Argentinian research grant UBACyT X847 (2006-2009).
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change of strategies, in a Nash equilibrium the game stabilizes. In [22], it is proved that
any noncooperative game in normal form has at least one Nash equilibrium. However, the
proof is not constructive and does not give any information about the existence of more
than one Nash equilibrium. The question posed is how to compute algorithmically Nash
equilibria and to determine the number of them in a given game.
Nash equilibria of noncooperative games in normal form can be regarded as real solu-
tions to systems of polynomial equations and inequalities (see, for instance, [29, Chapter
6]). In the case of two players, each equilibrium is the solution of a linear system of equa-
tions, and therefore, equilibria may be found exactly by using simplex type algorithms
(see, for instance, [15]); however, there is no polynomial time algorithm solving the prob-
lem (see [32]). In the general case of a game with more than two players, the polynomials
appearing are multilinear. To solve the problem of finding one equilibrium, some nu-
merical methods have been applied successfully (for example, some methods derived from
Scarf’s algorithm, [26]). Nevertheless, sometimes it is not sufficient to compute only one
equilibrium because, depending on the problem to be solved, not all the equilibria of a
game are equally interesting and the methods developed to compute only one equilibrium
do not allow us to decide beforehand whether it fulfills some additional properties or to
compare different equilibria.
A comparative study of different known methods for the computation of all the Nash
equilibria of a game may be found in [7]. In [12], a new algorithm solving this problem for
generic games by means of homotopy methods is presented, but no complexity bounds are
shown. In addition, the application of symbolic algorithms solving systems of equations
and inequalities over the real numbers is being studied in this context, motivated by the
characterization of the set of all the Nash equilibria of a game as a semi-algebraic set (an
example of this fact is the application of quantifier elimination algorithms over the real
numbers to compute approximated equilibria in [16]; see also the survey [17]). However,
up to now, no significative result had been obtained concerning the adaptation of these
algorithms in order to profit from the particular properties of the algebraic systems arising
in game theory.
In this paper, we study totally mixed Nash equilibria, that is to say, Nash equilibria in
which every player allocates a positive probability to each of his available strategies. Note
that a procedure to compute these equilibria can be used as a subroutine to compute all
Nash equilibria of the game by recursing over all possible subsets of used strategies. We
present a symbolic method to find a parametric description of the set of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of a generic game with a pre-fixed structure. This method is based on a symbolic
procedure for the computation ofmultihomogeneous resultants with complexity polynomial
in the degree and the number of variables of the resultant ([13]). Using the description
previously obtained, we show conditions (given by polynomial inequalities on the payoff
values) under which a game with the given pre-fixed structure will have the maximum
number of such equilibria. The next step is to give a similar parametric description
for particular games. First, we solve this problem under some genericity assumptions
implying, in particular, that the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game is
finite, and we show how to compute this number. Then, we consider the general case, in
which we give a parametric description of a finite set of points including all the isolated (in
the complex space) totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game, which enables us to bound
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the number of these isolated equilibria. All our algorithms have a complexity polynomial
in the number of pure strategies of each player, and the number of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of a generic game with the given structure.
This paper is organized in the following way:
In Section 2, we introduce some basic notions on game theory, the description of the
algorithmic model we are going to use and a mathematical formulation for the totally
mixed Nash equilibria of a game in normal form as the set of solutions of a system of
multihomogeneous polynomial equations. In Section 3, the algorithmic description of the
totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game is given, and it is used to find conditions
under which a game has the maximum number of these equilibria. In Section 4 we deal
with the totally mixed Nash equilibria of particular games. Finally, the last section is
devoted to proving some results about the algorithmic computation of multihomogeneous
resultants and upper bounds for their degrees which are used throughout the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions and Notation
2.1.1 Basic facts
Throughout this paper Q denotes the field of rational numbers, N denotes the set of
positive integers and N0 := N ∪ {0}.
IfK is a field, we denote an algebraic closure ofK byK. The ring of polynomials in the
variables x1, . . . , xn with coefficients in K is denoted by K[x1, . . . , xn]. For a polynomial
f ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] we write deg f to refer to the total degree of f and degxi f to refer to
the degree of f in the variable xi.
For n ∈ N and an algebraically closed field k, we denote by An(k) and Pn(k) (or simply
by An or Pn if the base field is clear from the context) the n-dimensional affine space and
projective space over k respectively, equipped with their Zariski topologies.
We adopt the usual notions of dimension and degree of an algebraic variety V , which
will be denoted by dimV and deg V respectively. See for instance [27] and [9] for the
definitions of these notions.
2.1.2 Game theory
In this section we present some basic game theory concepts. For a more detailed account
on the subject we refer the reader to any standard game theory text such as [24].
We consider non-cooperative games in normal form; that is to say, games in which there
is only one time step at which all the players move simultaneously without communicating
among themselves. We will assume that there are r players in the game having n1 +
1, . . . , nr + 1 distinct available pure strategies respectively (n1, . . . , nr ∈ N).
For i = 1, . . . , r:
• c(i) := (c
(i)
j1...jr
)0≤jk≤nk is the given payoff matrix of player i, where c
(i)
j1...jr
is the
payoff to player i if, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ r, player k chooses the strategy jk.
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• Xi := (xi0, xi1, . . . , xini) is a vector representing a mixed strategy of the ith player,
which is a probability distribution on his set of pure strategies (that is to say, xij is
the probability that the ith player allocates to his jth pure strategy).
With these notations, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the payoff to player i if the mixed strategies
X1, . . . ,Xr are played is:
πi(X1, . . . ,Xr) :=
∑
0≤j1≤n1
· · ·
∑
0≤jr≤nr
c
(i)
j1...jr
x1j1 . . . xrjr .
A Nash equilibrium is a vector of mixed strategies such that no player can increase
his payoff by changing unilaterally to another strategy while the other players keep their
strategies fixed; that is to say, a vector of mixed strategies X1, . . . ,Xr satisfying
πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr) ≥ πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,X
′
i,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r
for every mixed strategy X ′i. A totally mixed Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
in which each pure strategy is assigned a positive probability, that is, one that satisfies
xij > 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 0 ≤ j ≤ ni.
2.2 Data structure, algorithms and complexity
The algorithms we consider in this paper are described by arithmetic networks over the
base field Q (see [33]). An arithmetic network is represented by means of a directed
acyclic graph. The external nodes of the graph correspond to the input and output of the
algorithm. Each of the internal nodes of the graph is associated with either an arithmetic
operation in Q or a comparison between two elements in Q followed by a selection of
another node. These are the only operations allowed in our algorithms.
We assume that the cost of each operation in the algorithm is 1 and so, we define the
complexity of the algorithm as the number of internal nodes of its associated graph.
The objects our algorithms deal with are polynomials with coefficients in Q. We
represent each of them by means of one of the following data structures:
• Dense form, that is, as the array of all its coefficients (including zeroes) in a pre-fixed
order of all monomials of degree at most d, where d is an upper bound for the degree
of the polynomial. The size of this representation equals the number of monomials
of degree at most d.
• Sparse encoding, that is, as an array of the coefficients corresponding to monomials
in a fixed set, provided that we know in advance that the coefficient of any other
monomial of the polynomial must be zero. The size in this case is the cardinal of
the fixed set of monomials.
• Straight-line programs, which are arithmetic circuits (i.e. networks without branches).
Roughly speaking, a straight-line program (or slp, for short) over Q encoding a poly-
nomial f ∈ Q[x1, . . . , xn] is a program which enables us to evaluate the polynomial
f at any given point in Qn. Each of the instructions in this program is an addition,
subtraction or multiplication between two pre-calculated elements in Q[x1, . . . , xn],
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or an addition or multiplication by a scalar. The number of instructions in the pro-
gram is called the length of the slp. For a precise definition of straight-line programs
we refer to [5, Definition 4.2] (see also [11]).
2.3 Polynomial equations for totally mixed Nash equilibria
Now, we show that the totally mixed Nash equilibria of an r-person game in normal form
can be regarded as real solutions to a polynomial equation system (see [29, Sec. 6.3]).
Let us observe that, if the payoff matrix of player i is c(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ r), given mixed
strategies X1, . . . ,Xr, the payoff to player i is
πi(X1, . . . ,Xr) =
∑
j1,...,jr
c
(i)
j1...jr
x1j1 . . . xrjr
=
∑
0≤ji≤ni
xiji
∑
j1,...,ji−1,ji+1,...,jr
c
(i)
j1...jr
x1j1 . . . xi−1ji−1xi+1ji+1 . . . xrjr
=
∑
0≤ji≤ni
xiji πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, e
(i)
ji
,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr)
where e
(i)
j is the (j + 1)th vector of the canonical basis of R
ni+1.
Now, if (X1, . . . ,Xr) is a totally mixed Nash equilibrium, we have that xij > 0 for
every i, j. Then, in order that πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, · ,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) attains a maximum at
Xi = (xi0, . . . , xini) (among all the different probability distributions), a necessary and
sufficient condition is that
πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, e
(i)
ji
,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr) = πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, e
(i)
0 ,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr) ∀ 1 ≤ ji ≤ ni.
(1)
In fact, assuming that this condition does not hold for some 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let jmax and
jmin denote the indices of pure strategies leading to maximum and minimum payoffs to
player i respectively. Then, taking ε > 0 with ε < min{xijmin, 1 − xijmax} and changing
to the (totally) mixed strategy X ′i := Xi + ε(e
(i)
jmax
− e
(i)
jmin
) the ith player can increase his
payoff by
ε(πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, e
(i)
jmax
,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr)− πi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1, e
(i)
jmin
,Xi+1, . . . ,Xr)) > 0,
contradicting the fact that the vector is a totally mixed Nash equilibrium for the game.
Conversely, for a vector of totally mixed strategies (X1, . . . ,Xr) such that all the identi-
ties (1) hold for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, we have that πi(X1, . . . ,X
′
i, . . . ,Xr) = πi(X1, . . . ,Xi, . . . ,Xr)
for every mixed strategy X ′i and so, player i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) cannot increase his payoff by
unilaterally changing his strategy, which implies that (X1, . . . ,Xr) is a Nash equilibrium
for the game.
We conclude that the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game are those vectors
(X1, . . . ,Xr) with Xi := (xi0, . . . , xini) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r satisfying:
(a) xij > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 0, . . . , ni,
(b)
∑
0≤j≤ni
xij = 1 for i = 1, . . . , r,
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(c)
∑
J−i
a
(ik)
J−i
x1j1 . . . xi−1ji−1xi+1ji+1 . . . xrjr = 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and k = 1, . . . , ni, where
the sum runs over all J−i := j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for every t 6= i and
a
(ik)
J−i
:= c
(i)
j1...ji−1kji+1...jr
− c
(i)
j1...ji−10ji+1...jr
.
Let us observe that (c) is a system of n := n1 + · · · + nr multihomogeneous polyno-
mial equations in the r groups of variables X1, . . . ,Xr with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 variables
respectively (with degrees 1 or 0 with respect to each group) and, therefore, it defines a
(possibly empty) projective variety in Pn1(C) × · · · × Pnr(C). The complex solutions to
the polynomial equation system (c) will be called quasi-equilibria of the game (see [7]),
and those solutions not lying in any of the infinite hyperplanes {xi0 = 0} (1 ≤ i ≤ r) will
be called affine quasi-equilibria of the game.
Every quasi-equilibrium ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ P
n1(C) × · · · × Pnr(C) determines at most
one totally mixed Nash equilibrium of the game: for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let sξi :=
∑
0≤j≤ni
ξij
be the sum of the coordinates of ξi. If sξi 6= 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the unique associated
representation of ξ whose coordinates satisfy condition (b) is (ξ1/sξ1 , . . . , ξr/sξr), and it
will be a totally mixed Nash equilibrium if and only if all its coordinates are positive real
numbers.
2.4 On the number of solutions to a multihomogeneous system
Let r ∈ N be a positive integer. Fix positive integers n1, . . . , nr and consider r groups
of variables Xj := (xj0, . . . , xj nj), j = 1, . . . , r. We say that the polynomial F ∈
K[X1, . . . ,Xr] is multihomogeneous of multi-degree v := (v1, . . . , vr), where v1, . . . , vr are
non-negative integers, if F is homogeneous of degree vj in the group of variables Xj for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
Set n :=
∑r
j=1 nj. The classical Multihomogeneous Be´zout Theorem, which follows
from the intersection theory for divisors (see for instance [27, Chapter 4]), states that
the set of common zeroes (over an algebraically closed field) in the projective variety
Pn1 × · · · × Pnr of n generic multihomogeneous polynomials F1, . . . , Fn with multi-degrees
νi := (νi1, . . . , νir) for i = 1, . . . , n is a zero-dimensional variety with
Bezn1...,nr(ν1; . . . ; νn) :=
∑
(j1,...,jn)∈J
( n∏
i=1
νiji
)
(2)
points, where J := {(j1, . . . , jn) / #{k : jk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. For an alternative
proof of this result using deformation techniques, we refer the reader to [21], [19] and [10].
Note that this can be seen as a particular case of Bernstein’s theorem on the number of
common roots of sparse systems [3].
The quantity Bezn1...,nr(ν1; . . . ; νn) is called the Be´zout number of the generic multi-
homogeneous polynomial system. If k1, . . . , kt are positive integers with
∑t
i=1 ki = n, we
will use the notation Bezn1,...,nr(ν1, k1; . . . ; νt, kt) for the Be´zout number of a multihomo-
geneous system with ki polynomials of multi-degree νi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
The equations arising in our particular setting for the computation of totally mixed
Nash equilibria of a game are multilinear (see Section 2.3). Moreover, for a game with
r players with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, we have a system of n =
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∑r
j=1 nj polynomial equations consisting of exactly ni polynomials of multi-degrees equal
to di := (1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ (N0)
r (where the 0 lies in the ith coordinate of di) for every
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, according to the previous formula, a system coming from a generic game
with the given structure will have
δ :=
∑
(j11,...,j1n1 ,...,jr1,...,jrnr )∈J
( r∏
i=1
ni∏
k=1
dijik
)
(3)
solutions in Pn1 × · · · × Pnr , where J := {(j11, . . . , j1n1 , . . . , jr1, . . . , jrnr) / #{jhk : jhk =
i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. In fact, for a “generic” game, this will be the number of totally
mixed Nash equilibria (see [18]).
We are going to deal with the case in which δ > 0. This inequality can be determined
by considering the set of exponents appearing with non-zero coefficients in each of the
polynomials in the system (see [23, Chapter IV, Proposition 2.3]) and in our particular
case, it is equivalent to the fact that nj ≤
∑
1≤k≤r, k 6=j nk = n − nj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
From now on, we will assume that these inequalities hold.
Taking into account that dii = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the only n-tuples contributing
to the sum (3) are those where jik 6= i for every 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, and for each of them, the
corresponding term of the sum equals 1. Therefore, δ equals the cardinality of the set
J0 = {(j11, . . . , jrnr ) / jik 6= i∀ 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and #{jhk / jhk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. (4)
2.5 Geometric resolutions
A way of representing zero-dimensional affine varieties which is widely used in computer
algebra nowadays is a geometric resolution. This notion was first introduced in the works
of Kronecker and Ko¨nig in the last years of the XIXth century [14]. Roughly speaking,
it consists in a parametric description of the variety in which the parameter values range
over the set of roots of a univariate polynomial. Now, we give the precise definition we
are going to use.
Let V = {ξ(1), . . . , ξ(δ)} ⊂ An be a zero-dimensional variety defined by polynomials in
K[x1, . . . , xn]. Given a separating linear form ℓ = u1x1 + · · · + unxn ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] for
V (that is, a linear form ℓ such that ℓ(ξ(i)) 6= ℓ(ξ(k)) if i 6= k), the following polynomials
completely characterize the variety V :
• the minimal polynomial p :=
∏
1≤i≤δ(T − ℓ(ξ
(i))) ∈ K[T ] of ℓ over the variety V
(where T is a new variable),
• polynomials w1, . . . , wn ∈ K[T ] with degwj < δ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n satisfying
V =
{(w1
p′
(η), . . . ,
wn
p′
(η)
)
∈ K
n
/ η ∈ K, p(η) = 0
}
.
The family of univariate polynomials p,w1, . . . , wn ∈ K[T ] is called the geometric resolu-
tion of V (associated with the linear form ℓ).
In our particular setting of totally mixed Nash equilibria computation, we will not
only deal with zero-dimensional varieties in an affine space, but we will also consider
zero-dimensional subvarieties of Pn1 × · · · × Pnr .
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Write ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ P
n1 × · · · × Pnr with ξi := (ξi0 : · · · : ξini) (1 ≤ i ≤ r) to
denote a point in the projective variety Pn1 × · · · × Pnr . Assume that V ⊂ Pn1 × · · · ×Pnr
is a zero-dimensional variety defined by multihomogeneous polynomials in K[X1, . . . ,Xr]
such that ξi0 6= 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r) holds for every point ξ ∈ V . Then, we may associate with V
the following zero-dimensional variety in An, where n := n1 + · · ·+ nr:
{(ξ′1, . . . , ξ
′
r) ∈ A
n / ξ′i = (ξi1/ξi0, . . . , ξini/ξi0) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, ξ ∈ V }.
A geometric resolution p,w11, . . . , w1n1 , . . . , wr1, . . . , wrnr ∈ K[T ] of this zero-dimensional
variety will also be called a geometric resolution of V ⊂ Pn1 × · · · × Pnr . In this case, the
geometric resolution of V provides the following description of the variety:
V =
{(
(p′(η) : w11(η) : · · · : w1n1(η)), . . . , (p
′(η) : wr1(η) : · · · : wrnr(η))
)
/ η ∈ K, p(η) = 0
}
.
3 On the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game
This section is devoted to the study of totally mixed Nash equilibria of generic games. In
order to do this, we will begin by treating the payoff values as parameters and computing
a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of the associated generic game. This
geometric resolution will provide a rational formula of the parameters which, for generic
values of them, represents the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game.
Then, we will obtain a finite number of generic conditions ensuring that a specific
game has the maximum possible number of totally mixed Nash equilibria. Under these
conditions, the Nash equilibria of the game can be described by the geometric resolution
obtained by substituting the given payoffs for the parameters in our generic formulas.
3.1 The set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game
Here we are going to compute a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of a
generic game with r players with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively, where
ni ∈ N for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, let A
(ik) := (A
(ik)
j1...ji−1ji+1...jr
)0≤jt≤nt be a set of new
indeterminates and
F
(i)
k :=
∑
J−i
A
(ik)
J−i
x1j1 . . . xi−1ji−1xi+1ji+1 . . . xrjr , (5)
where the sum runs over all J−i := j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for every
t 6= i; that is, F
(i)
k is a generic multihomogeneous polynomial of multi-degree di :=
(1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ (N0)
r (where 0 is in the i-th coordinate).
Note that, if (C
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt are new variables that are regarded as parameters
representing the generic payoffs of the game, from the polynomials introduced in (5), we
can obtain the polynomials defining the quasi-equilibria of the generic game by substituting
A
(ik)
J−i
:= C
(i)
j1...ji−1kji+1...jr
− C
(i)
j1...ji−10ji+1...jr
(6)
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for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and each J−i = j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for
every t 6= i. Thus, we are going to compute a geometric resolution of the solution set of
the generic polynomial system F
(i)
k = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, and then, we will make the
substitution (6) in the result to get the desired geometric resolution of the quasi-equilibria
of the generic game.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1 Let notations be as in Section 2. There is an algorithm which computes a ge-
ometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game with r players having n1+
1, . . . , nr+1 pure strategies respectively, within complexity O(D
2(D+n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r
2n4(n3+
rN))), where
D :=
∑
0≤i≤r
niBezn1,...,nr(d0, n0; d1, n1; . . . ; di, ni − 1; . . . ; dr, nr) (n0 := 1, d0 := (1, . . . , 1)),
δ := Bezn1,...,nr(d1, n1; . . . ; dr, nr),
n :=
∑
1≤i≤r
ni,
N := n+ 1 +
∑
1≤i≤r
ni(n1 + 1) . . . (ni−1 + 1)(ni+1 + 1) . . . (nr + 1).
The algorithm obtains polynomials P (T ), Wij(T ) ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ] with degT P = δ, degT Wij <
δ and degrees bounded by D in the parameters C
(i)
j1...jr
, which are encoded by straight-line
programs of length O(D2(D + n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN))).
Proof. The geometric resolution of the system F
(i)
k = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, will be
obtained by means of multihomogeneous resultant computations. More precisely, we are
going to obtain the geometric resolution associated to a linear form ℓ which separates
the points of the generic system by computing the resultant of our system and a generic
linear form. The minimal polynomial of ℓ and the polynomials Wij will be obtained by
specializing the resultant and some of its partial derivatives in the coefficients of ℓ.
We introduce a set of new indeterminates A(0) := (A
(0)
0 , A
(0)
ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
which stand for the coefficients of a generic affine linear form A
(0)
0 +
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
A
(0)
ij xij in
the n = n1+ · · ·+nr variables xij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), and we consider the multilinear
polynomial
F0 := A
(0)
0 x10 . . . xr0 +
∑
1 ≤ i ≤ r
1 ≤ j ≤ ni
A
(0)
ij x10 . . . xi−1 0xijxi+10 . . . xr0,
which is obtained by homogenizing the generic affine linear form with respect to each
group of variables X1, . . . ,Xr.
The first step of the algorithm consists in the computation of the polynomial resultant
R = Res(F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(1)
n1 , . . . , F
(r)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr ). According to [20, Theorem 1], this resul-
tant coincides with the specialization of the resultant of a system of multihomogeneous
polynomials of respective multi-degrees d0 = (1, . . . , 1), d
(1)
j = (0, 1, . . . , 1) for 1 ≤ j ≤
9
n1, . . . , d
(r)
j = (1, . . . , 1, 0) for 1 ≤ j ≤ nr, in which all the coefficients of the polynomial
of multi-degree d0 corresponding to monomials not appearing in F0 are substituted for 0.
Thus, in order to obtain the polynomial R we apply an adapted version of the algorithm
underlying the proof of [13, Theorem 5] (see Subsection 5.1). With our previous notation,
the complexity of this algorithm is of order O(D2(D + n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN)))
and it computes a straight-line program for R whose length is of the same order.
Then, a standard procedure enables us to compute a geometric resolution of the zero-
dimensional variety defined by the system F
(i)
k = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) from the
polynomial R: the polynomials giving the parametrization of the points in the variety are
obtained from the partial derivatives
R0 :=
∂R
∂A
(0)
0
and Rij :=
∂R
∂A
(0)
ij
(1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni),
which we compute from the straight-line program representing R within the same com-
plexity order as in the first step. These partial derivatives are encoded by straight-line
programs of length of the same order as for the straight-line program encoding R (see [5]).
Note that deg
A
(0)
0
Rij < δ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
Let L :=
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
Lijxij be a generic linear form in the variables xij , where Lij are new
variables, and let T be another new variable. Consider the polynomial PL ∈ Q[A
(ik), Lij ][T ]
obtained by specializing
A
(0)
0 7→ T, A
(0)
ij 7→ −Lij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) (7)
in R. Since the resultant R is in the ideal (F0, F
(i)
k : 1 ≤ k ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk), then
substituting L for T in PL, we obtain a polynomial P which is in the ideal (F
(i)
k : 1 ≤ k ≤
r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk). Taking into account that degT (PL) = δ, which is the number of solutions
of the system F
(i)
k = 0, it follows that PL is a multiple by a nonzero factor in Q[A
(ik)] of
the minimal polynomial of L. On the other hand, taking the partial derivative of P with
respect to the variable Lij, we get
∂P
∂Lij
= −
∂R
∂A
(0)
ij
(L,−Lij , A
(ik)) +
∂R
∂A
(0)
0
(L,−Lij , A
(ik))xij ∈ (F
(i)
k : 1 ≤ k ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ nk).
We conclude that making the substitution (7) in R0 and Rij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
we obtain polynomials which complete the geometric resolution of the variety defined by
F
(i)
k = 0 with respect to the generic linear form L :=
∑
1≤i≤r
1≤j≤ni
Lijxij .
Finally, in order to obtain a geometric resolution for the zero set of the generic system,
we choose a separating linear form and we substitute its coefficients for the parameters Lij .
As the multihomogeneous system F
(i)
k = 0 is generic, it has no zeroes in the hyperplanes
xi0 = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r) and we can consider its zeroes as affine points by setting xi0 = 1
(1 ≤ i ≤ r). Let us show that the linear form ℓ :=
∑
1≤i≤r xi1 separates these affine
points. To this end, it is enough to show the existence of a choice of coefficients such
that the induced polynomial system has the maximum number of affine roots and that ℓ
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separates those roots. To see this, choose coefficient vectors for the polynomials F
(i)
k so
as to obtain a specific system f
(i)
k with the maximum number of affine solutions, and take
a linear form l ∈ Q[xij ; 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni] separating the common affine roots of the
polynomials f
(i)
k . Now, making a linear change of variables in each group Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ r),
the linear form l maps to ℓ and the specific system considered leads to a polynomial system
of the same structure in the new variables, which is the particular system we were looking
for.
Hence, the algorithm proceeds to specialize
A
(0)
0 7→ T, A
(0)
i1 7→ −1 (1 ≤ i ≤ r), A
(0)
ij 7→ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 2 ≤ j ≤ ni)
in the polynomials R, R0 and Rij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) to obtain new polynomials
giving the geometric resolution of the set of common zeros of the polynomials F
(i)
k in
Pn1 × · · · × Pnr .
If (C
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt are the parameters representing the generic payoffs of a game
with the given structure, in order to obtain the geometric resolution of the set of its quasi-
equilibria it suffices to substitute C
(i)
j1...ji−1kji+1...jr
−C
(i)
j1...ji−10ji+1...jr
for the coefficient A
(ik)
J−i
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni and each J−i = j1 . . . ji−1ji+1 . . . jr with 0 ≤ jt ≤ nt for
every t 6= i. In this way, the algorithm obtains polynomials P (T ), ∂P/∂T (T ) and Wij(T )
in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ] such that the set of quasi-equilibria of the generic game in Pn1 × · · · ×Pnr
is represented as follows:
{(
(
∂P
∂T
(t) :W11(t) : · · · : W1n1(t)), . . . , (
∂P
∂T
(t) :Wr1(t) : · · · : Wrnr(t))
)
/ t ∈ K, P (t) = 0
}
,
(8)
where K := Q(C
(i)
j1...jr
). The polynomials P , ∂P/∂T and Wij are encoded by straight-
line programs of length O(D2(D + n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN))) over Q, which is also
the order of complexity of the whole computation. The upper bounds degT P ≤ δ and
degT Wij < δ follow from the stated upper bounds for the degrees of R and Rij in the
variable A
(0)
0 . 
3.2 Games with the maximum number of totally mixed Nash equilibria
The existence of games with the maximum possible number of totally mixed Nash equilib-
ria, namely the multihomogeneous Be´zout number δ of the associated polynomial equation
system, was proved in [18]. However, no characterization of those games has been provided.
In this subsection, we will obtain a finite family of polynomial conditions (inequalities over
the reals) ensuring that a given game satisfying those conditions has δ totally mixed Nash
equilibria. We keep our previous assumptions and notation.
Let P (T ) andWij(T ) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ] be polynomials, as in The-
orem 1, which give a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria (see (8)) of a game
with r players with n1+1, . . . , nr +1 strategies and generic payoffs (C
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt .
Consider a specific choice of payoff values c := (c
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt over R and assume
that the polynomials P (c)(T ) and Wij(c)(T ) obtained from P (T ) and Wij(T ) by spe-
cializing the parameters at c provide a geometric resolution of the set of quasi-equilibria
11
of the game with the given payoffs. Then, the arguments in the last paragraph of sub-
section 2.3 imply that the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game are those points
(ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ R
n1+1 × · · · × Rnr+1 of the form
ξi =
(P ′(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
,
Wi1(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
, . . . ,
Wi ni(c)(t)
Si(c)(t)
)
(1 ≤ i ≤ r),
where P ′ := ∂P/∂T and Si := P
′ +
∑
1≤j≤ni
Wij , having all their coordinates real and
positive; that is, with t belonging to
{t ∈ R : P (c)(t) = 0, P ′(c)(t) > 0, Wij(c)(t) > 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}
or
{t ∈ R : P (c)(t) = 0, P ′(c)(t) < 0, Wij(c)(t) < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}.
Equivalently, t must belong to the intersection
⋂
1≤i≤r, 1≤j≤ni
{t ∈ R : P (c)(t) = 0, (P ′(c)Wij(c))(t) > 0}. (9)
Thus, our polynomial conditions on the payoff vector c which imply that the associated
game has δ totally mixed Nash equilibria will state, on the one hand, that the generic
geometric resolution can be specialized into c leading to a geometric resolution of the set
of quasi-equilibria of the game with the given payoffs and, on the other hand, that the
cardinality of the set introduced in (9) equals δ.
Note that each of the sets appearing in the intersection defined in (9) is described by
means of one equality and one inequality of univariate polynomials over R. In order to
estimate the cardinality of one of these sets, we will apply the following well-known result
due to Hermite (see, for example, [1, Theorem 4.13]):
Proposition 2 Let p, q ∈ R[T ] be polynomials and assume that p is square-free. Let Sq :
R[T ]/(p)×R[T ]/(p)→ R be the symmetric bilinear map defined by Sq(f, g) = Trace(Mfqg),
where for every H ∈ R[T ], MH : R[T ]/(p) → R[T ]/(p) denotes the linear map MH(f) =
H · f . Then
Signature(Sq) = #{η ∈ R / p(η) = 0, q(η) > 0} −#{η ∈ R / p(η) = 0, q(η) < 0}.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3 Under the previous assumptions and notations, there is a family of nδ + 1
polynomials S0, S
(h)
ij , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and 1 ≤ h ≤ δ, in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt \ {0}
with total degrees bounded by 4δ2D, such that for every vector c := (c
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt
with real coordinates satisfying the conditions
S0(c) 6= 0, S
(h)
ij (c) > 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ),
the game with r players with n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies and payoff values given by
c has δ totally mixed Nash equilibria.
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The polynomials S0 and S
(h)
ij can be obtained algorithmically within complexity O(δ
2(nδ2+
L)) from a straight-line program of length L encoding polynomials P, Wij as in Theorem
1. The algorithm computes straight-line programs of length O(δ2(δ2 + L)) which encode
these polynomials.
F or every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, let G
(i)
k ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][X1, . . . ,Xr] be the polynomial
obtained after F
(i)
k (see (5)) by means of the substitution stated in (6). The system
G
(i)
k = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) defines the quasi-equilibria of a generic game with r
players and n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 pure strategies respectively.
Let P (T ) and Wij(T ) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ] be polynomials as in
Theorem 1 which give a geometric resolution of the set of common zeros of G
(i)
k over an
algebraic closure of K := Q(C
(i)
j1...jr
).
Denote P ′ the derivative of the polynomial P with respect to its main variable T . Let
us consider the resultant
S0 := Resδ,δ−1(P (T ), P
′(T )) ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]
of P (T ) and P ′(T ) regarded as polynomials in the single variable T with coefficients
in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
], where the subindices indicate the degrees in the variable T of P and P ′
respectively.
Let us observe that, for every real vector c = (c
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt with S0(c) 6= 0, the
polynomial P (c)(T ) obtained by specializing all the coefficients of P (T ) at c is a non-zero
square-free polynomial of degree δ. Furthermore, the solution set of the system G
(i)
k (c) = 0,
1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni, is a zero-dimensional sub-variety of P
n1 × · · · × Pnr with δ distinct
points and the polynomials P (c)(T ), Wij(c)(T ) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) give a geometric
resolution of this variety.
Therefore, if the condition S0(c) 6= 0 holds, taking into account that degT (P (c)(T )) =
δ, the arguments at the beginning of this subsection imply that the game with payoff
vector c will have δ distinct totally mixed Nash equilibria if and only if every root t of
P (c) is real and satisfies (P ′(c)Wij(c))(t) > 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni (see (9)).
This additional condition can be restated as
#{t ∈ R : P (c)(t) = 0, (P ′Wij(c))(t) > 0} = δ ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
Since degT P = δ, this last condition is equivalent to
Signature(SP ′Wij(c)) = δ ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. (10)
Note that for any fixed pair of indices i, j, being SP ′Wij(c) a bilinear form defined over
a vector space of dimension δ, the equality Signature(SP ′Wij(c)) = δ holds if and only if all
the eigenvalues of the matrix of SP ′Wij(c) in an arbitrary basis of the space are positive,
which is in turn equivalent to the fact that the coefficient sequence of the characteristic
polynomial of this matrix, whose roots are all real, has δ sign changes. The conditions
stating these sign changes will be the inequalities ensuring that the game has the maximum
number of totally mixed Nash equilibria.
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Now, we will obtain the polynomials S
(h)
ij giving the inequalities in the statement of the
theorem by considering the bilinear forms SP ′Wij for generic payoffs and performing all our
computations over the parameter field K = Q(C
(i)
j1...jr
), that is, we will consider the bilinear
form SP ′Wij : K[T ]/(P ) × K[T ]/(P ) → K. Let M
(ij) ∈ Kδ×δ be the matrix of SP ′Wij in
the basis B := {1, T, . . . , T δ−1}. Note that, for every real vector c = (c
(i)
j1...jr
)1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt
with S0(c) 6= 0, the coefficient of T
δ of the polynomial P (c)(T ) is not zero. Then, the
matrix of the bilinear form SP ′Wij(c) can be computed by specializing M
(ij) at c.
Actually, to deal with polynomials instead of rational functions of the parameters, we
will not compute the matrices M(ij) of the bilinear forms SP ′Wij but (scalar) multiples
of them with polynomial entries. In what follows, we will first show how to obtain these
matrices. Then, we will compute the coefficients of their characteristic polynomials, and
we will estimate their degrees and the overall complexity for their computation.
Before proceeding, we are going to make some remarks about the denominator-free
computation of traces of multiplication maps in K[T ]/(P ). It is easy to see that for all
H ∈ K[T ], we have MH = H(MT ); that is, every multiplication map is a polynomial
function of the multiplication map MT : K[T ]/(P )→ K[T ]/(P ), whose matrix in the basis
B := {1, T, . . . , T δ−1} can be read off from P . In fact, if we write P =
∑δ
k=0 pk T
k, with
pk ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]1≤i≤r, 0≤jt≤nt, the matrix of MT in the basis B is


0 . . . . . . 0 −p0
pδ
1 0 . . . . . . −p1
pδ
0
. . .
. . . · · ·
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 1 −
pδ−1
pδ


.
In order not to deal with denominators in our computations in the case when H ∈
Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ], we will consider the multiplication map MpδT , whose matrix in the basis
B is
M :=


0 . . . . . . 0 −p0
pδ 0 . . . . . . −p1
0
. . .
. . . · · ·
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 pδ −pδ−1


.
If H =
∑d
h=0 bhT
h with bh ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
], we have that Trace(MH) =
∑d
h=0 bhTrace((MT )
h)
and, therefore, we can obtain a multiple of Trace(MH) working over the polynomial ring
Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
] due to the following identity which holds for every K ≥ d:
pKδ Trace(MH) =
d∑
h=0
pK−hδ bhTrace((MpδT )
h). (11)
Taking into account the previous remark, we are able to obtain a multiple of the matrix
M(ij) by a sufficiently big power of the leading coefficient pδ with all its entries in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]
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by working over this polynomial ring: for every 1 ≤ α, β ≤ δ, we have that
(M(ij))α,β = Trace(MTα−1P ′WijTβ−1) (12)
and then, as degT (P
′) < δ and degT (Wij) < δ, the upper bound deg(T
α−1P ′WijT
β−1) ≤
4δ− 4 holds. We conclude that the matrix p4δ−4δ M
(ij) has all its entries in the polynomial
ring Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]. Moreover, as we are multiplying the matrixM(ij) by an even power of pδ,
for every payoff vector c with S0(c) 6= 0, the identity
Signature(M(ij)(c)) = Signature(pδ(c)
4δ−4M(ij)(c))
holds (note that S0(c) 6= 0 implies pδ(c) 6= 0).
Therefore, our algorithm will compute the matrices p4δ−4δ M
(ij) and then, their char-
acteristic polynomials Xij = T
δ +
∑δ
h=1(−1)
hS
(h)
ij T
δ−h ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
][T ] for every 1 ≤ i ≤
r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. Our previous arguments imply that for a payoff vector c with S0(c) 6= 0,
condition (10) is equivalent to
S
(h)
ij (c) > 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ h ≤ δ.
Now we detail the successive steps of the algorithm, we estimate its complexity and
the length of a straight-line program encoding the output polynomials S
(h)
ij , and we give
an upper bound for the degrees of these polynomials.
The entries of the matrices p4δ−4δ M
(ij) are obtained according to identities (12) and
(11).
First, from a straight-line program of length L encoding the polynomials P and Wij
(1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), we obtain a straight-line program of length O(δ
2L) for the
coefficients of P in the variable T and a straight-line program of length O(δ2(L+ n)) for
the coefficients of all the polynomials P ′Wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) in the variable T
within complexity O(δ2(L+ n)) (see [5, Lema 21.25]).
Then, using the coefficients of P , the matrix M ∈ Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]δ×δ of the multiplication
map MpδT is constructed and the powers M
h for h = 0, . . . , 4δ − 4 are computed. Note
that every matrix in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]δ×δ can be multiplied by M with O(δ2) additions and
multiplications in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
] and so, the powers Mh for h ≤ 4δ − 4 of this matrix can
be computed within O(δ3) polynomial additions and multiplications. Thus, we obtain
straight-line programs of length O(δ2(δ+L)) for the entries of the matrices Mh (0 ≤ h ≤
4δ − 4) within complexity O(δ3).
Therefore, a straight-line program of length O(δ2(δ + L)) computing Trace((MpδT )
h),
for every 0 ≤ h ≤ 4δ − 4 is obtained with O(δ2) additional operations.
Now, fix i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. Let P
′Wij =
∑2δ−2
h=0 b
(ij)
h T
h be the
expansion of P ′Wij in the variable T with coefficients in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]. Recall that in the first
step of the algorithm we have obtained a straight-line program of length O(δ2(L+n)) for
the polynomials b
(ij)
h . For every α, β with 1 ≤ α, β ≤ δ, we obtain a straight-line program
for (p4δ−4δ M
(ij))α,β by means of the formula:
p4δ−4δ Trace(MTα−1P ′WijTβ−1) =
2δ+α+β−4∑
h=α+β−2
p4δ−4−hδ b
(ij)
h−α−β+2Trace(M(pδT )h)
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within additional complexity O(δ). The length of this straight-line program is O(δ2(δ +
L+ n)).
The complexity of the computation of the entries of all the matrices p4δ−4δ M
(ij) from
the coefficients b
(ij)
h and the traces Trace((MpδT )
h) is O(nδ2).
Finally, we apply the division-free algorithm described in [2] in order to compute the
coefficients of the characteristic polynomial Xij of each of these matrices. For every 1 ≤
i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, the algorithm produces straight-line programs of length O(δ
2(δ2+L+n))
encoding these coefficients within complexity O(δ4).
The overall complexity of the algorithm is O(δ2(nδ2 + L)).
Let us observe that the entries of the matrices p4δ−4δ M
(ij) are polynomials in Q[C
(i)
j1...jr
]
of total degrees bounded by 4δD and so, the polynomials S
(h)
ij obtained by the described
procedure, which are the (signed) coefficients of the characteristic polynomials Xij , have
total degrees bounded by 4δ2D. 
Note that, with the same notation as in the previous theorem, for a generic game
with the given structure (namely, any game whose payoff vector c satisfies S0(c) 6= 0)
the conditions S
(h)
ij (c) > 0 are equivalent to the fact that the considered game has the
maximum possible number of totally mixed Nash equilibria.
4 The set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arbitrary
game
When dealing with a particular game with specific payoff values, the geometric resolution of
the set of quasi-equilibria of a generic game with the same structure might not be useful
in order to describe the quasi-equilibria of the given game. For instance, the minimal
polynomial P (T ) or its derivative ∂P
∂T
(T ) computed by the algorithm shown in Theorem 1
could vanish identically when specialized at the considered payoff values. This section is
aimed at adapting the procedures previously developed in order to handle these particular
situations.
First, we show an algorithm computing a geometric resolution of the set of affine quasi-
equilibria of the game provided that it has a zero-dimensional set of quasi-equilibria. In
a second step, this algorithm is extended to find all isolated affine quasi-equilibria of an
arbitrary game.
Once a finite set of affine quasi-equilibria of a game including the isolated ones is
computed, we apply standard algorithms of semialgebraic geometry to estimate the number
of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game.
4.1 Games with a zero-dimensional set of quasi-equilibria
As in the previous sections, we consider an r-person non-cooperative game in normal form
in which the players have n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 distinct available pure strategies each. Let
c(i) := (c
(i)
j1,...,jr
)0≤jk≤nk denote the payoff matrix to player i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Then, the polynomial equations defining the Nash equilibria of the game (see Section
2.3) can be obtained by specializing the coefficients of each of the generic multilinear
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polynomials F
(i)
k introduced in (5) in the vector a
(ik) := (a
(ik)
j1...ji−1ji+1...jr
)0≤jt≤nt defined
from the payoffs of the game as follows a
(ik)
j1...ji−1ji+1...jr
:= c
(i)
j1...ji−1kji+1...jr
−c
(i)
j1...ji−10ji+1...jr
.
Thus, if a := (a(ik))1≤i≤r, 1≤k≤ni , the set of quasi-equilibria of the game is the algebraic
variety
Va := {ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ P
n1 × · · · × Pnr / F
(i)
k (a, ξ) = 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni}.
In this section we consider the case when Va is zero-dimensional. In order to decide
whether this is the case for given payoff values, we study the non vanishing of an adequate
multihomogeneous resultant. More precisely, we consider a generic polynomial of multi-
degree d0 := (1, . . . , 1) in the groups of variables X1, . . . ,Xr,
F0 =
∑
1 ≤ i ≤ r
0 ≤ ji ≤ ni
A
(0)
j1...jr
x1j1 . . . xrjr
and the resultant R := Res(F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(1)
n1 , . . . , F
(r)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr ). Let Ra(A
(0)
j1...jr
) be the
polynomial obtained by substituting the coordinates of a = (a(ik))1≤i≤r, 1≤k≤ni for the
variables A(ik) in the polynomial R. Then:
Remark 4 The algebraic variety Va is either zero-dimensional or empty if and only if the
polynomial Ra is not identically zero.
Proof. If Va is empty, the result is straightforward. If Va is zero-dimensional, there exists
a multilinear polynomial f0 ∈ Q[X1, . . . ,Xr] which does not vanish at any of the (finitely
many) points of Va and therefore, Ra does not vanish at the coefficients of f0.
On the other hand, if the projective variety Va has positive dimension, any multilinear
polynomial f0 has zeros in Va. Therefore, Ra is identically zero. 
Now we will show how to decide whether Ra is identically zero algorithmically and we
will estimate the complexity of this procedure.
First, we compute the multihomogeneous resultant R by means of the algorithm de-
scribed in [13] adapted according to Subsection 5.1 below. Thus, a straight-line program
of length L := O(D2(D+ n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN))) encoding R is obtained within
complexity of the same order as L. The specialization A(ik) := a(ik) which leads us to the
polynomial Ra does not modify this complexity order.
Since Ra is a multivariate polynomial in
∏
1≤i≤r(ni+1) variables encoded by a straight-
line program, we do not know its coefficients; moreover, the complexity to compute them
is exponential. Therefore, in order to decide whether it is the zero polynomial or not, we
will make a suitable specialization so that solving this problem amounts to solving the
same problem in the univariate setting.
More precisely, we specialize the variable coefficients A
(0)
j1...jr
into successive powers of
a new variable t, that is,
A
(0)
j1...jr
= tj1+(n1+1)j2+(n1+1)(n2+1)j3+···+(
Qr−1
j=0(nj+1))jr . (13)
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Making this specialization in F0, we obtain a new polynomial f0 ∈ Q[t][X1, . . . ,Xr]. Let
us show that if Va consists of finitely many points, there is a polynomial f0(t0) with
coefficients of this type (namely, successive powers of the same scalar t0) which does not
vanish at any point of Va.
For every ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξr) ∈ P
n1 × · · · × Pnr , we have
f0(ξ)(t) =
∑
j1...jr
ξ1j1 . . . ξrjrt
j1+(n1+1)j2+(n1+1)(n2+1)j3+···+(
Qr−1
j=0(nj+1))jr ∈ C[t],
which is a non-zero polynomial, due to the fact that there exists at least one choice
of j1, . . . , jr for which the product ξ1j1 . . . ξrjr is not 0. Now, if Va is a finite set, we
may consider the polynomial ∆(t) :=
∏
ξ∈Va
f0(ξ)(t). Note that ∆ ∈ C[t] is a non-zero
polynomial and, therefore, there exists t0 ∈ Q with ∆(t0) 6= 0. Due to the definition of ∆,
the polynomial f0(t0) ∈ Q[X1, . . . ,Xr] does not vanish at any point of Va. This implies
that the resultant of f0(t0), F
(i)
k (a
(ik)) (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) is not zero, that is, the
polynomial Ra,t ∈ Q[t] obtained by specializing Ra following (13) does not vanish at t0.
We conclude that Ra,t is not the zero polynomial.
Therefore, in order to decide whether Ra ∈ Q[A
(0)
j1...jr
] is zero or not, it suffices to decide
whether the associated polynomial Ra,t ∈ Q[t] is zero or not. Taking into account that
deg(Ra,t) ≤ (
∏
1≤i≤r(ni + 1)− 1)δ, it follows that this task can be achieved by evaluating
Ra,t at (
∏
1≤i≤r(ni +1))δ distinct values of t, which is done by substituting the powers of
these values for the variables A
(0)
j1...jr
according to (13) in the straight-line program for Ra.
The overall complexity of this procedure is
(
(
∏
1≤i≤r(ni+1))+L
)
(
∏
1≤i≤r(ni+1))δ =
O(D2(n1 . . . nr)
2δ(D + n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN))).
Assume now that the set of quasi-equilibria of the given game is finite, that is, the
polynomial Ra is not identically zero.
Proposition 5 Following the previous assumptions and notation, there is an algorithm
which computes a geometric resolution of the set of affine quasi-equilibria of a game with r
players having n1+1, . . . , nr+1 pure strategies respectively within complexity O(δ
8D2(D+
n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n5(n3 + rN))) provided that the associated set of quasi-equilibria Va is
zero-dimensional.
Proof. We will obtain the desired geometric resolution from the specialized resultant Ra.
In order to do this, we first show that this specialized resultant factorizes as follows:
Ra = Ca
∏
ξ∈Va
F0(ξ)
mξ , with Ca ∈ Q, mξ ∈ N.
Set Fa :=
∏
ξ∈Va
F0(ξ) ∈ Q[A
(0)]. For a given coefficient vector a(0), we have that
Fa(a
(0)) = 0 if and only if there is a point ξ ∈ Va such that F0(a
(0), ξ) = 0; that is,
if and only if F0(a
(0)), F
(1)
1 (a
(11)), . . . , F
(r)
nr (a
(rnr)) have a common root in Pn1 × · · · ×Pnr .
But this last condition is equivalent to the fact that the resultant Res(F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr )
vanishes at a(0), a(11), . . . , a(rnr) or, equivalently, that Ra(a
(0)) = 0. We conclude that the
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polynomials Fa and Ra have the same zero set and so, they have the same irreducible
factors, which proves our assertion.
We are interested in describing the set of affine quasi-equilibria of the game, that is,
the variety V affa := {ξ ∈ Va : ξi0 6= 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. For this reason, we are going to compute
the polynomial Raffa :=
∏
ξ∈V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ . Note that
Ra = Ca
∏
ξ∈Va−V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ
∏
ξ∈V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ , (14)
where Raffa =
∏
ξ∈V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ is monic in the variable A
(0)
0...0 and
∏
ξ∈Va−V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ does
not depend on this variable. Then, Ca
∏
ξ∈Va−V affa
F0(ξ)
mξ is the leading coefficient of Ra
in the variable A
(0)
0...0. Therefore, R
aff
a can be obtained from Ra by dividing it by this
leading coefficient.
Let us consider the generic form f0 := A
(0)
0 x10 . . . xr0+
∑
1 ≤ i ≤ r
1 ≤ j ≤ ni
A
(0)
ij x10 . . . xi−1 0xijxi+10 . . . xr0.
After specializing Raffa as follows:
A
(0)
0...0 7→ A
(0)
0
A
(0)
0...0 j 0...0 7→ A
(0)
ij where the index j is in the ith place (1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
A
(0)
j1...jr
7→ 0 otherwise
(15)
we obtain the polynomial P˜a :=
∏
ξ∈V affa
f0(ξ)
mξ . The geometric resolution of the variety
V affa can be obtained from the square-free part Pa :=
∏
ξ∈V affa
f0(ξ) of P˜a and the partial
derivatives of Pa as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 and substituting the powers of a
conveniently chosen scalar for the variables Aij .
Now we estimate the complexity of the different steps of our algorithm.
Computation of Raffa : First, we compute the degree da := degA(0)0...0
(Ra). To do this, let
t0 ∈ Q be the element we have already obtained such that Ra,t(t0) 6= 0. Let R
(t0)
a ∈ Q[A
(0)
0...0]
be the (non-zero) polynomial obtained from Ra after specializing it as in (13) for every
(j1, . . . , jr) 6= (0, . . . , 0) setting t = t0. Because of (14), deg(R
(t0)
a ) = da. Then, in order
to compute da, it suffices to compute the coefficients of R
(t0)
a up to degree δ (which is
an a priori upper bound for da). The complexity of this computation is of order O(δ
2L).
Now we obtain an slp of length O(δ2L) for the coefficient of (A
(0)
0...0)
da of Ra and we obtain
Raffa by dividing Ra by this coefficient. As the divisor does not vanish when its variables
are specialized in the successive powers of t0, this polynomial division can be done within
complexity O(δ4L), and produces an slp of the same order ([28]).
Computation of the polynomial Pa: We obtain Pa as the quotient P˜a/gcd(P˜a,
∂ ePa
∂A
(0)
0
).
The specialization in (15) gives an slp for P˜a without modifying the previous length.
To obtain the square-free part of P˜a, we apply a well-known subresultant-based pro-
cedure for the computation of the gcd of two polynomials (see, for instance, [4]). We
proceed as before by specializing all the variables in P˜a, except for the main variable A
(0)
0
into the successive powers of a new variable t and deal with the polynomial we obtain in
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Q[t][A
(0)
0 ]. We will use the following notation: given F ∈ Q[A
(0)
0 , A
(0)
ij ], F
(t) will denote
the polynomial obtained from F by doing the previously mentioned specialization.
Let G = gcd(P˜a,
∂ ePa
∂A
(0)
0
). As, for ξ1 6= ξ2 we have that f
(t)
0 (ξ1) y f
(t)
0 (ξ2) are relatively
prime irreducible polynomials in Q[A
(0)
0 , t], we have that
G(t) =
∏
ξ∈V affa
f
(t)
0 (ξ)
mξ−1 = gcd(P˜ (t)a ,
∂P˜
(t)
a
∂A
(0)
0
).
Then, we can obtain d˜a := deg(gcd(P˜a,
∂ ePa
∂A
(0)
0
)) using the polynomials P˜
(t)
a and
∂ eP (t)a
∂A
(0)
0
. In
order to compute the degree of the gcd of these polynomials, we look for their first non-
zero subresultant. In each step, to decide whether the considered subresultant (which is a
polynomial of degree at most 2δ2n in Q[t]) is zero or not, we evaluate the variable t in a
sufficient number of elements of Q. First, we obtain an slp of length O(δ4L+n) for P˜
(t)
a and
then an slp of length O(δ2(δ4L+n)) for its coefficients in the variable A
(0)
0 . For a specific
evaluation of t the complexity of the computation of all the subresultants is O(δ6L+ δ2n),
and therefore, the whole complexity of this step is bounded by O(δ8Ln+δ4n2). We obtain
G˜ = sra . gcd(P˜a,
∂ ePa
∂A
(0)
0
) as the polynomial subresultant of index d˜a, where sra is the main
subresultant of index d˜a, within complexity O(δ
6L).
Finally, the polynomial Pa is obtained by dividing sraP˜a by G˜. Note that we already
know a point τ where sra does not vanish (τ is the value obtained in the previous step
when computing d˜a). Then, if we consider the nonzero polynomial G˜
(t)(A
(0)
0 , τ) ∈ Q[A
(0)
0 ]
of degree d˜a, by evaluating it in at most d˜a+1 elements in Q, we obtain a
(0)
0 ∈ Q such that
G˜(t)(a
(0)
0 , τ) 6= 0. This enables us to compute the quotient Pa by applying the classical
division avoiding algorithm in [28]. The complexity of this step is of order O(δ8L).
Observe that the linear form ℓ whose coefficients are (−τk)0≤k≤n−1 is a separating
linear form for V affa . To compute the required geometric resolution associated with ℓ from
the polynomial Pa we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1: we specialize Pa and its
partial derivatives at the coefficients of ℓ.
The overall complexity of the algorithm is O(δ8Ln+δ4n2) = O(δ8D2(D+n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n5(n3+
rN))). 
Now, we are able to compute the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game
with zero-dimensional set of quasi-equilibria from the geometric resolution given by Propo-
sition 5.
Let p and wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) be the polynomials giving the geometric
resolution of V affa . Then, the totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game are the points
(ξ1, . . . , ξr) with ξi = (p
′(t)/si(t), wi1(t)/si(t), . . . , wir(t)/si(t)), where si = p
′ +
∑ni
j=1wij
for i = 1, . . . , r, and t is a root of p, having all their coordinates real and positive.
Then, the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game equals the cardinality
of the union of the sets
{t ∈ R : p(t) = 0, p′(t) > 0, wij(t) > 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}
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and
{t ∈ R : p(t) = 0, p′(t) < 0, wij(t) < 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}.
Once we have the polynomials p, p′ and wij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}) encoded in dense
form, by using the algorithm in [6, Section 3.3], it is possible to compute this cardinality
within complexity O(nδ3).
Therefore we have:
Proposition 6 Following the previous assumptions and notation, there is an algorithm
which computes the number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with r players having
n1+1, . . . , nr+1 pure strategies respectively within complexity O(δ
8D2(D+n1 . . . nrδ log(D)r
2n5(n3+
rN))) provided that the associated set of quasi-equilibria of the game is zero-dimensional.
4.2 Computing the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of an arbitrary game
When we are dealing with an arbitrary game, it may happen that the set Va of its quasi-
equilibria has positive dimension and, therefore, the polynomial Ra introduced in the
previous subsection is identically zero. In this case, we are going to use a procedure
applied in [10] to obtain a non-zero multiple of the minimal polynomial of a generic linear
form over the isolated points of the set V affa of affine quasi-equilibria. For the sake of
completeness, we are going to explain this procedure briefly.
We consider a sufficiently generic coefficient vector b := (b(ik))1≤i≤r,1≤k≤ni such that
Rb 6≡ 0 (we remark that the vector b can be chosen at random or effectively constructed
as the coefficient vector a system with δ many common roots). Then, if τ is a new
variable, the polynomial Ra+τ(b−a) is non-zero. If f
(i)
k denotes the polynomial obtained
from F
(i)
k by evaluating xj0 = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ r), let f˜
(i)
k := f
(i)
k (a
(ik) + τ(b(ik) − a(ik)))
(1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni). Let P˜a+τ(b−a) be the polynomial obtained from Ra+τ(b−a) by
specializing it as in (15) and let L :=
∑
i,j A
(0)
ij xij .
As P˜a+τ(b−a)(τ,A
(0)) |τ=0≡ 0, there exists ǫ > 0 such that P˜a+τ(b−a) = τ
ǫP˜ for a
polynomial P˜ ∈ Q[τ,A(0)] with P˜ (τ,A(0)) |τ=0 6≡ 0. Let P := P˜ |τ=0,A(0)0 =−T
. We are going
to show that this polynomial P is a multiple of the minimal polynomial of L over the set
of isolated points of V affa .
Since the polynomial R is a linear combination of F0, F
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni), we
have that P˜a+τ(b−a) |A(0)0 =−L
= τ ǫP˜ |
A
(0)
0 =−L
∈ (f˜
(i)
k : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni) ∈ Q[τ, xij : 1 ≤
i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni].
Now, taking into account that the number of variables τ, xij (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni)
is greater than the number of generators of the ideal (f˜
(i)
k : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ ni), we
deduce that each irreducible component of the variety Vτ defined by this ideal in A
n+1
has dimension at least 1. Then, for each isolated point ξ of V affa , the point (0, ξ) ∈ A
n+1
lies in an irreducible component C of Vτ such that τ /∈ I(C). Therefore P˜ |A(0)0 =−L
∈ I(C)
and P |T=L vanishes at ξ.
Now, we are going to show how to compute the polynomial P .
Let P˜a+τ(b−a) =
∑δ
j=0 pj(τ)(A
(0)
0 )
j, where pj(τ) are polynomials in Q[A
(0)
ij ][τ ] such that
pj(τ) 6≡ 0 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ D. Then ǫ := max{k : τ
k divides pj ∀ 0 ≤ j ≤ D}.
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The procedure for the computation of P from a straight-line program encoding R runs
as follows:
(1) Obtain an slp for P˜a+τ(b−a).
(2) Obtain an slp encoding the coefficients pj(τ) (0 ≤ j ≤ δ).
(3) For j = 0, . . . δ:
(3.a) Obtain an slp for the coefficients of pj(τ) =
∑D
k=0 pjk τ
k.
(3.b) Compute ǫj := min{k : pjk 6= 0}.
Compute ǫ := min{ǫj : 0 ≤ j ≤ δ}.
(4) Obtain an slp for P =
∑δ
j=0(−1)
jpjǫT
j from the slp’s encoding pjǫ (0 ≤ j ≤ δ).
Now, we are going to estimate the complexity of this procedure. Let L be the length
of a straight-line program encoding R.
In step (1), we compute first a+ τ(b− a) with 3N operations and then, we specialize
the slp for R according to (15). We obtain an slp of length 3N + L for P˜a+τ(b−a). The
interpolation in step (2) takes O(δ2(N +L)) operations. The complexity of step (3.a) is of
order O(D2δ2(N+L)). In order to determine whether each of the multivariate polynomials
pjk ∈ Q[A
(0)
ij ] encoded by an slp is zero or not, we apply the probabilistic Zippel-Schwartz
zero test (see [34]). The overall complexity of step (3) is O(D2δ3(N + L)). Step (4) does
not modify the order of the complexity.
From the polynomial P we have computed we can obtain a geometric resolution for a
finite set of points including the isolated points of V affa in the same way we showed in the
proof of Theorem 1, obtaining a description for the isolated affine quasi-equilibria of the
game. Therefore, we have:
Theorem 7 Let notations be as in Theorem 1. There is a probabilistic algorithm which
computes, given a game with r players having n1+1, . . . , nr+1 pure strategies respectively,
a geometric resolution of a finite set of points including the isolated affine quasi-equilibria
of the game within complexity O(D4δ3(D + n1 . . . nr δ log(D)r
2n4(n3 + rN))).
Proceeding as in the previous section, from the geometric resolution given by this
theorem, we are able to obtain an upper bound on the number of isolated (in the complex
space) totally mixed Nash equilibria of the game within the same order of complexity as
in the previous theorem.
5 Resultants in the multihomogeneous setting
5.1 Computing resultants
In this subsection we are going to show how the algorithm in [13] can be adapted in order
to compute the multihomogeneous resultants we use. That procedure computes multiho-
mogeneous resultants under the assumption that the coordinates of each multidegree are
all positive and this is not the case in our situation.
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First, we will prove that the multihomogeneous resultant we want to compute is a
non-constant polynomial and then, we will show how to modify the Poisson formula on
which the algorithm in [13] relies All the computations required once the Poisson formula
is recursively applied run in the same way as in [13].
In order to do this, we are going to use the theory in [30] and [20]. We can ap-
ply these results to our situation because the multihomogeneous resultant of a family of
multihomogeneous polynomials G0, . . . , Gn in r groups of variables Xj = (xj0, . . . , xjnj),
with
∑r
j=1 nj = n, coincides with the sparse resultant of the dehomogenized polynomials
g0, . . . , gn obtained by setting xj0 = 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
Let A0, . . . ,An ⊂ Z
n be finite sets and let g0, . . . , gn be polynomials with supports
A0, . . . ,An respectively.
For any subset J ⊆ {0, . . . , n}, let LJ be the lattice generated by
∑
j∈J Aj. Follow-
ing [30], if I ⊂ {0, . . . , n}, the collection of supports {Ai}i∈I is said to be essential if
rank(LI) = #I − 1 and rank(LJ) ≥ #J for each proper subset J of I.
If there is a unique subcollection {Ai}i∈I which is essential, the resultant Res(g0, . . . , gn)
coincides with the resultant Res(gi; i ∈ I).
Note that if G is a multihomogeneous polynomial in r groups of n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1
variables each with multidegree (ν1, . . . , νr), the set of exponent vectors of the dehomoge-
nized polynomial g is ∆n1,ν1 × · · · ×∆nr,νr ⊂ Z
n1 × · · · × Znr , where ∆ni,νi is νi times the
unitary simplex in Zni for i = 1, . . . , r.
In our particular case, we will deal with families of multihomogeneous polynomials in
r groups of m1 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables respectively and multidegrees (1, . . . , 1) or di =
(1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) (with 0 in the ith coordinate) for i = 1, . . . , r. If one of the polynomials
in the family indexed by I has multidegree (1, . . . , 1), then rank(LI) =
∑r
i=1mi, and the
same holds if the family contains polynomials with multidegrees di and dj with i 6= j. If
all the polynomials in the family have multidegree di, then rank(LI) =
∑
j 6=imj.
The resultant will be computed recursively by applying Poisson’s formula ([20, Lemma
13]). At each step, we will have to compute a multihomogeneous resultant in one of the
following settings, where m1, . . . ,mr ∈ N and m := m1 + · · ·+mr:
(I) m+1 multihomogeneous polynomials in r groups of m1+1, . . . ,mr+1 variables: one
polynomial with multidegree (1, . . . , 1) and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r,mi polynomials with
multidegrees di := (1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) with 0 in the coordinate i, under the assumption
that mi ≤
∑
j 6=imj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
(II) m + 1 multihomogeneous polynomials with multidegrees (1, . . . , 1) in r groups of
m1 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each,
(III) mmultihomogeneous polynomials in r groups of variables withm1,m2+1, . . . ,mr+1
variables each, with mi polynomials of multidegree di for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, under the
assumption that mi ≤
∑
j 6=imj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Now we are going to start with the recursion.
The resultant R = Res(F0, F
(1)
1 , . . . , F
(1)
n1 , . . . , F
(r)
1 , . . . , F
(r)
nr ) we want to compute in
the proof of Theorem 1 involves a family of multihomogeneous polynomials satisfying the
conditions in (I) with mi := ni and m := n. Note that, for a generic game to have a
non-empty set of quasi-equilibria, the inequalities mi ≤
∑
j 6=imj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r hold.
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Let G
(0)
0 and G
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi) be a family of polynomials satisfying the
conditions in (I) and let I := {(0, 0)} ∪ {(i, k) : 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi}.
First, note that rank(LI) = m = #I − 1. Let J be a proper subset of I. If there
exist (i, k), (i′, k′) in J with i 6= i′, then rank(LJ) = m ≥ #J and the same holds
if (0, 0) ∈ J . On the other hand, if J ⊂ {(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ mi} for a fixed i 6= 0, then
rank(LJ) =
∑
j 6=imj ≥ mi ≥ #J . Therefore, the set of all supports is the unique essential
subset. So, the resultant is not constant and the following identity holds:
Res(G
(0)
0 , (G
(i)
k )1≤i≤r;1≤k≤mi) =
∏
ξ∈V
g
(0)
0 (ξ)
∏
1≤j≤r
Res(G
(i)
kj )1≤i≤r,1≤k≤mi),
where g
(0)
0 is the dehomogeneized polynomial obtained from G
(0)
0 by evaluating xℓmℓ = 1
(1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r), V is the set of common zeros in Am of the polynomials g
(i)
k obtained in the
same way from the G
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi), and, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ r, G
(i)
kj is the
polynomial obtained from G
(i)
k by setting xj mj = 0.
(I.a) Note that if mi ≥ 2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, (up to renaming variables and polynomi-
als) each of the resultants Res(G
(i)
kj ) involves a family of polynomials satisfying the
conditions in (III).
(I.b) Without loss of generality, assume now that m1 = 1. Here, we can discard the first
group of variables. Then, we have to compute the resultant of m polynomials in r−1
groups of m2 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each with mi polynomials with multidegree
(1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) where the zero is in the (i − 1)th coordinate for 2 ≤ i ≤ r and one
with multidegree (1, . . . , 1).
If, for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r, mi <
∑
1≤j≤r, j 6=imj, since m1 = 1 we deduce that mi ≤∑
2≤j≤r, j 6=imj and so, the polynomial system obtained is of the form (I) but with
one group of variables less than the original one.
On the other hand, if mi = 1 +
∑
2≤j≤r, j 6=imj for some 2 ≤ i ≤ r, we have that
mj < mi for every j 6= i. Therefore, the unique essential subset is {(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤
mi} and the resultant to be computed is the resultant of the corresponding family
of mi polynomials of multidegree (1, . . . , 1) in r − 2 groups of m2 + 1, . . . ,mi−1 +
1,mi+1 + 1, . . . ,mr + 1 variables each, which is the situation in (II).
If the polynomials involved satisfy the conditions in (II), all the coordinates of their
multidegrees are not zero and so, we can apply the algorithm in [13] for the computation
of their resultant.
To analyze (III), let us consider first the case when r = 2. Here, the assumption on
the numbers mi implies that m1 = m2 :=M .
(III.a) We consider the resultant of M polynomials with multidegrees (0, 1) and M polyno-
mials with multidegrees (1, 0) in two groups of M and M + 1 variables respectively.
Now the unique essential set is the corresponding to the first M polynomials and,
therefore their resultant equals the determinant of the matrix of their coefficients.
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Assume now that r > 2. Note that the equality mi =
∑
j 6=imj may be valid for at most
one value i. If, on the contrary, mi1 =
∑
j 6=i1
mj and mi2 =
∑
j 6=i2
mj hold for i1 6= i2, it
follows that
∑
j 6=i1,i2
mj = 0, which implies r = 2. Let G
(i)
k (1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi) be a
family of polynomials satisfying the conditions in (III).
(III.b) If m1 = 1, we are under the same assumptions as in (I.b).
(III.c) If m1 ≥ 2 and mi =
∑
j 6=imj for some 2 ≤ i ≤ r, the set {(i, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ mi}
is essential. The assumption r > 2 implies that it is the unique essential subset.
Then, the resultant we compute is that ofmi multilinear polynomials of multidegrees
(1, . . . , 1) in r− 1 groups of m1,m2 + 1, . . . ,mi−1 + 1,mi+1 + 1 . . . ,mr + 1 variables
respectively. Thus, we are in situation (II).
(III.d) If m1 ≥ 2 and mi <
∑
j 6=imj for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r, we deduce that mi ≤ m1 − 1 +∑
j 6=1,imj for every 2 ≤ i ≤ r. Therefore, the unique essential subset is the whole
family of polynomials and applying Poisson’s formula we obtain:
Res((G
(i)
k )1≤i≤r;1≤k≤mi) =
∏
ξ∈V
g
(1)
1 (ξ)
∏
2≤l≤r
Res((G
(1)
kl )2≤k≤m1 ; (G
(i)
kl )2≤i≤r,1≤k≤mi),
where g
(1)
1 is the dehomogeneized of G
(1)
1 by setting xjmj = 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ r,
V is the set of common zeros in Am−1 of the polynomials g
(1)
k (2 ≤ k ≤ m1), g
(i)
k
(2 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ mi) obtained in the same way from the homogeneous polynomias
G
(i)
k , and G
(i)
kl is the polynomial obtained from G
(i)
k by setting xlml = 0.
According to the previous formula, we will have to compute r−1 multihomogeneous
resultants of m′ = m− 1 polynomials each:
For l = 2, . . . , r, setting m′ := m − 1, m′1 := m1 − 1 and m
′
i := mi for i 6= 1, the
resultant to be computed involves m′ polynomials in r groups of m′1+1, . . . ,m
′
l−1+
1,m′l,m
′
l+1 + 1, . . . ,m
′
r + 1 variables each with m
′
i polynomials of multidegree di for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ r. We havem′1 ≤
∑
j 6=1m
′
j and, for i 6= 1, the condition mi <
∑
j 6=imj
implies that m′i ≤
∑
j 6=im
′
j; therefore, renaming variables and polynomials, we are
again under the assumptions of (III).
5.2 A bound for the degree of the resultant
This section is devoted to proving an upper bound for the degree D of the resultant of
multi-linear polynomials appearing in our previous computations in terms of the total
number n of strategies available to the players and the number δ of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of a generic game with the given structure.
As before, we assume n = n1 + · · · + nr with ni ∈ N for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r. We
consider the resultant R of a family of n + 1 multi-linear polynomials in r groups of
n1 + 1, . . . , nr + 1 variables each, consisting of a polynomial F0 of multi-degree d0 :=
(1, . . . , 1) and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, a set of ni polynomials F
(i)
k (1 ≤ k ≤ ni) of multi-
degree di := (1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, . . . , 1), where the 0 lies in the ith coordinate.
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Throughout this section, we will denote
δi := Bezn1,...,nr(d0, 1; d1, n1; . . . ; di, ni − 1; . . . ; dr, nr), i = 1, . . . , r,
the number of solutions to a generic polynomial system of the indicated multi-degrees.
Recall that δ = Bezn1,...,nr(d1, n1; . . . ; dr, nr).
The resultant R is a multihomogeneous polynomial in the coefficients of F0, F
(i)
k of
degree δ in the coefficients of F0 and δi in the coefficients of F
(i)
k for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤
k ≤ ni (see, for instance, [25]). Therefore, the total degree of R equals
D = δ +
∑
1≤i≤r
niδi. (16)
The following result provides an upper bound for δi which will allow us to deduce an upper
bound for D.
Proposition 8 For every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, we have δi ≤ (ni + 1)δ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we will prove the stated upper bound for i = 1.
First, note that the formula in the right hand side of identity (2) for the compu-
tation of the Be´zout number of a multihomogeneous system of polynomial equations
shows that this number is additive in each of the multi-degrees involved. Hence, as δ1 =
Bezn1,...,nr(d0, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr, nr) with d0 = d1 + e1, where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
we have
δ1 = Bezn1,...,nr(d1, n1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr, nr) + Bezn1,...,nr(e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr, nr)
= δ + Bezn1,...,nr(e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr, nr).
Now, identity (2) implies that Bezn1,...,nr(e1, 1; d1, n1 − 1; d2, n2; . . . ; dr, nr) = #J1, where
J1 = {(j11, . . . , jrnr) / j11 = 1, jik 6= i∀ (i, k) 6= (1, 1) and #{jhk / jhk = i} = ni ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ r}.
In order to finish the proof, we will show that #J1 ≤ n1δ. Since δ equals the cardinality
of the set J0 introduced in (4), we will compare the cardinalities of both sets J1 and
J0. To this end, we define the following map from J1 to J0: with a given n-tuple j :=
(1, j12, . . . , j1n1 , . . . , jr1, . . . , jrnr) ∈ J1 we associate the n-tuple j
′ ∈ J0 which is obtained
by exchanging the first coordinate of j (which equals 1) with the first one which is different
from 1 and is located beyond the n1th coordinate. Note that a necessary condition for two
distinct n-tuples in J1 to lead to the same n-tuple in J0 by means of this assignment is
that they coincide in all of their coordinates except for two of them located among the n1
coordinates n1 + 1, . . . , 2n1. Moreover, the vector consisting of these n1 coordinates must
be of the form (1, . . . , 1, jhk, . . . ) for both of them (possibly with no 1 at the beginning)
and so, they can only differ in the length of the string of 1’s in this vector, which ranges
between 0 and n1 − 1. We conclude that each element of J0 is the image of at most n1
elements of(1) J1. It follows that #J1 ≤ n1#J0.
Therefore, we have that δ1 ≤ δ + n1δ = (n1 + 1)δ. 
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Using the previous result along with identity (16) for the degree D of the resultant,
we conclude:
Corollary 9 With the previous assumptions and notations,
D ≤
(
1 +
∑
1≤i≤r
ni(ni + 1)
)
δ ≤ n2δ.
Remark 10 The bound stated in Corollary 9 shows that all the algorithms presented in
this paper are polynomial in the number of strategies n1, . . . , nr of the r players, and the
generic number δ of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with the considered structure.
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